BothTargeted attacks. The CIA is not, as the NSA might, scooping up secure, encrypted communications in transit between people, and then later revealing those conversations. Instead, the CIA is doing what the CIA, as a spy agency focused on collecting intelligence from individuals, does: looking for a way into a specific person’s phone. Then, once it's in that phone, it is bypassing the encryption and recording data and audio transmitted to the device. The fact is most encryption apps, for most purposes, work. We tend to think of security as a binary function: the door is locked or it isn’t. Same with messages sent on an encrypted messaging service: they are either locked or not. But that's misleading. Your locked front door keeps casual intruders and pranksters out; which is enough for most of us, most of the time. But the truth is, it won’t stop a determined burglar with tools, and it won’t stop a cop with a warrant. Most of us aren't targeted and never will be (sorry self-important tech reporters). So communicating with encrypted messaging services means that our messages likely (highly likely) won’t ever be seen by anyone except the person who unlocks them at the other end of our communication chain. What the WikiLeaks trove shows shouldn't surprise anyone: the CIA has a way to get into some phones, some of the time, in the process of looking for information from a specific individual.
uncritically accepted the premise: that there's something wrong with these encryption apps. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Rather, the existence of these hacking tools is a testimonial to the strength of the encryption. It's hard or impossible to break, so the CIA is resorting to expensive, targeted attacks.
Read More: Popular Science